Dari Lombroso ke Neuro-Yurisprudensi: Meniadakan Paradigma Hukum Pidana Klasik

Abstract

Classical criminal law bases individual responsibility on the assumptions of free will and rational capacity, which are considered universal. However, this model of responsibility is no longer adequate when faced with neuroscientific findings that demonstrate that behavioral control is determined by brain structure and function, which vary across individuals. This study aims to deconstruct the normative foundations of criminal law through a neurological analysis of the capacity for responsibility and to formulate an alternative neuro-jurisprudence-based model that is more compatible with the biological conditions of legal subjects. The method used is normative research with a conceptual and argumentative approach. The results show that a criminal legal system that maintains a free will framework is unable to accurately distinguish between perpetrators with the capacity for conscious control and those without. Furthermore, there is no institutional mechanism for scientifically assessing an individual's neurological integrity in the judicial process. Under these conditions, criminal law operates on a structure of assumptions that has been abandoned by science. The neuro-jurisprudence approach suggests that criminal responsibility must be transformed from a moral assessment to an evaluation of neurologically verifiable capacity. This reform is a fundamental requirement for building a criminal legal system that is not only normatively valid but also biologically accurate.